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Defense Budgetary Processes in the Third World: 
Does Regime Type Make a Difference? 
Robert E. Looney* 
IN1RODUCTION 
During the last two decades, there has been a keen interest and a 
growing literature on the many economic dimensions of military 
expenditures in developing countries (LDCs).1 Six major avenues of 
research in this area have been undertaken somewhat independently: 
1. examinations of whether military spending helps, hinders or has no 
effect on economic growth;2 
2. comparisons of the effects, if any, regime types (usually civilian vs. 
military) have on economic performances;3 
3. determining if budgetary priorities vary by regime type;4 
4. identification of the economic environments necessary for success-
ful production of armaments in the third world;5 
5. identification of the economic factors responsible for the inter-
national trade in arms;6 and finally 
6. assessments of the major economic determinants of defense 
expenditures in third world countries.7 
Much has been written on the first four areas. If one theme has been 
common to all of these issues, it is the potential role of regime type to 
modify, across countries, the inter-relationships between economic 
factors and the various facets of military related activities. Perhaps 
because many analysts consider military expenditures to be deter-
mined by exogenous factors,8 i.e., regional conflicts and arms races, 
super power alliances and the like, little cross-section comparative 
analysis has been undertaken to determine whether and to what extent 
civilian and military regimes differ with respect to the amount of 
resources they allocate to defense. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the discussion on this sixth 
major area of research - the determinants of defense spending by 
drawing on this common theme; do the patterns of defense expendi-
tures in the third world vary significantly between military and civilian 
regimes, and if so, why? 
* Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgr:duate School, Monterey. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Research to date in this area has largely focused on the identification of 
possible linkages between military influence over the decision-making 
process for allocating resources and the level of budgetary support 
acquired by the military. The central hypothesis of such efforts is that 
military regimes will be more generous in supporting the military than 
will their civilian counterparts: 
The vested interests of the military establishment will push it 
towards higher security-related expenditures. This consideration 
is closely related to the power of the military, even in a country 
with a civilian government; the more powerful the military in 
relation to the civil authority, the greater the chance that the 
military can increase its share of the government budget and the 
national product.9 
While these propositions seem rather self-evident, empirical research 
has generally failed to identify strikingly different patterns of defense 
expenditures between civilian and military regimes.10 
In summarizing the quantitative work in this area11 it is fairly safe to 
say that most researchers have concluded that independent variables 
other than regime type probably hold more explanatory power in 
accounting not only for resource allocations for national defense, but 
also for other socio-economic expenditures. 
Robert Rothstein has recently summarized the work in this area by 
observing that 
The general consensus among most analysts now seems to be that 
the military have some influence in all regimes, thus suggesting a 
continuum (not an either/or dichotomy), and that military 
regimes tend to act much the same as civilian regimes in economic 
and social matters - an unsurprising outcome since both kinds of 
regimes face the same internal and external constraints. There is 
also very little. evidence that military regimes act more aggres-
sively than civilian regimes, automatically spending much more 
on arms, or interpret threat situations in a unique manner. 12 
While not necessarily disagreeing with these findings, it seems that in 
order to resolve the regime/defense allocation issue, a clear distinction 
needs to be made between a government's ability and its willingness to 
allocate funds to defense. In fact, it is most likely that the failure 
explicitly to take this factor into account has been responsible for 
previous cross-sectional studies' inability• to find sharp linkages 
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between third world regime types and the amount of funds allocated to 
defense. 
The analysis below blends these two major themes - the role 
economic factors play in affecting military expenditures (the ability to 
allocate funds for defense) and the policy priorities of military regimes 
(the willingness to allocate funds for defense). It will be shown that 
these two themes, each of which has individually produced inconclu-
sive findings, when integrated are capable of yielding highly significant 
and insightful results. 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A major methodological problem in any study of this sort concerns the 
classification of countries as military or civilian. Various attempts have -
been made to identify the military component in politics. Here, a 
logical approach is to classify countries on the basis of subjective " 
estimates of the degree of military influence in the day-to-day decision-
making of the government. 13 A government directly controlled by the 
armed forces is an extreme example of militarization of the political 
process. But even long-established democracies where civilian control 
of the military is a firm tradition are not immune to military influence.14 
The basis of this influence is not hard to find: within the central 
government structure, the military bureaucracy has the largest person-
nel component and administers the largest share of the public budget -
factors which clearly have a bearing on the military's political influence. 
For purposes of this study, countries are considered under military 
control 15 if they meet one or more of the following criteria: key political 
leadership by military officers; existence of a state of martial law; extra-
judicial authority exercised by security forces; lack of central political 
control over large sections of the country where official or unofficial 
security forces rule; or control by foreign military organizations. 16 
The countries that fall into this group,17 classified as military and 
civilian (in the early 1980s), share some common features. Most have 
long records of military rule: the average in 1982 was 16 years out of the 
prior 23.18 Perhaps one reason previous studies concluded that civilian 
and military did not differ significantly with regard to their allocations 
to defense lies in the fact that both regime types show a striking 
similarity with regard to several of the standard indices used to compare 
the military burden: 19 
1. in terms of the share of national resources allocated for military 
purposes, civilian regimes spent 4.5% of their gross national 
product on defense, compared to 5.2% ·ror the military regimes; 
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2. civilian regimes allocated 15.6% of their central government's 
budget to defense, compared with 16.5% for military regimes; and 
3. civilian regimes had 7 .3 soldiers per 1000 population compared 
with 6.2 for the military regimes. 
While the military regimes averaged a higher level of arms imports -
$315 million dollars vs. $233 million - civilian regimes tended to have 
higheroveralllevels of military expenditures-$1511 million, vs. $1112 
million for their military counterparts. 
HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
Any complete explanation of third world military expenditures should 
• incorporate three main elements. The military influence has already 
been addressed. In addition military expenditure will be affected by the 
amount of resources deemed necessary by ruling elites as sufficient for 
·assuring their survival in power. Economic constraints represent the 
final element. Oearly, however, these last two considerations are often 
quite interrelated. 
More specifically, the general absence of resources in many third 
world countries sharply narrows the range of elite choices and not only 
makes repression and higher military spending more likely, but also has 
an impact on the legitimacy of the state. Legitimacy relates to whether 
citizens are loyal and willingly support state policies - whether they 
accept the authority of the state and believe existing institutions are in 
some sense appropriate. In general, illegitimate governments must use 
much of the resources they control to stay in power and to secure 
compliance; conversely, legitimate governments can expend more 
available resources on public goods. 
Governmental effectiveness is related to legitimacy in the sense that 
loyalty and support are not likely to survive the state's decreasing 
ability to fulfill the needs of its citizens. In contrast to democratic 
regimes, which rely on some degree of consent by the governed, the 
military regimes must rely more heavily on effectiveness. 
Along these lines; Rothstein has constructed a framework whereby 
the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy is an important 
element in explaining the level of military expenditures.20 
Operationally, both variables, effectiveness and legitimacy, are 
difficult to estimate and require some degree of subjective judgment by 
analysts. The same is also true for the degree of threat (external or 
internal) perceived by ruling elites. After consulting with various 
authorities, Rothstein constructed a matrix capable of classifying 
developing countries on the basis of government legitimacy and degree 
190 ARMS CONTROL 
of threat. It should be noted that judgments about country placement 
were made in May and June of 1984.21 
In general, those countries which experience low legitimacy also 
tend to experience a high level of threat. On the other hand, those 
countries experiencing medium to high levels of legitimacy tend to 
experience low levels of threat. While there are several exceptions to 
this general pattern, it was felt that for the purposes of this paper, a 
simple two group sample was sufficient i.e., conflict countries were 
defined as countries of low governmental effectiveness while non-
conflict countries were defined as having medium to high levels of 
government effectiveness and/or low threat.22 
Everything else equal, we should observe significant differences in 
budgetary priorities between the conflict and non-conflict states, 
independent of regime types. More precisely, we should expect to find 
the conflict states to have a much higher proportion of their central 
government budgets assigned to military related activities. 
An examination of the budegtary patterns of the two groups tends to "' 
verify this prediction i.e., the non-conflict countries allocate 13.3 per 
cent of their central government budgets to defence, compared to 22.3 
per cent for their conflict counterparts. 
A final critical element in any empirical study of military expendi-
tures involves operationalizing the concept of 'threat'. According 
to Weede, decision-makers routinely respond to perceived foreign 
threats by increasing their armed forces, often by introducing con-
scription. He concludes that serious threats to national security and the 
resulting high military participation ratios produce over time higher 
overall levels of military expenditures.23 
Here it is important to distinguish between expenditures on arma-
ments and total allocations to the defense sector. It turns out that for 
most countries the highest proportion24 of defense expenditure is not 
spent on armaments, but rather on personnel, with a substantial 
additional proportion allocated to operations and maintenance. While 
it may be true that external factors influence the amount of actual 
weaponry purchased, their effect is more obvious in the case of 
personnel. 
A related factor is that expenditure on recurrent items, especially 
wages, is much less prone to change than 'development' expendi-
tures.25 
Operationally, therefore, we assume the ratio of armed forces to the 
overall population in the previous year to be indicative of the degree of 
threat perceived by the ruling elites. Following Harris,26 we assume 
that a perceived threat is met, over time, b)' purchasing more sophisti-
cated equipment bases, etc. Operationally, we assume a one-year lag 
• 
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between the increase in perceived threat and the increase in military 
manpower, with a further one-year lag for significant increases in arms 
imports to take place.27 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Based on the above discussion a simple model of military expenditures 
was constructed and estimated with a two-stage least squares regres-
sion technique. The three elements of military expenditure: regime 
type, survival/threat, and economic constraint were systematically 
introduced into the functional equations to obtain estimates of the 
various facets of military expenditures: arms imports, total military 
expenditures, the size of the armed forces, the share of defense in the 
central government budget, and the military burden. 
1. It is reasonable to assume that arms imports (AI) will have a direct 
relationship to total military expenditures (ME), and the foreign 
exchange available to the country. Several recent studies28 have 
documented the role external public borrowing has played in 
financing military expenditures in the Third World and, beginning 
in the mid-1970s, this variable appears to have expanded in line with 
the arms build-up in the Third World. Public sector external 
indebtedness (PDB) was selected to depict this phenomenon. 
Finally, gross international reserves (GIRB) are assumed ceteris 
paribus to set a general limit on the ability of countries to import 
arms. 
2. Everything else equal, total military expenditures should be related 
to the overall economic size of the cpuntry (here depicted by gross 
national product, GNP, and population, POP). Allowing for 
continuity, military expenditures in the previous year (ME80) were 
also included in the regression equations. 
3. Similarly, the number of personnel in the armed forces was assumed 
to vary with the economic size of the country (GNP and POP) 
together with the overall level of military expenditures (ME). 
4. The influence of ·factors related to conflict (CONFLICT) outlined 
above are assumed to have their greatest effect on the share of the 
government budget allotted to defense (GEDB). Military vs. 
civilian defense/socioeconomic priorities were depicted by includ-
ing health expenditures (GEHB) in the regression equation (a 
negative sign is assumed for the military regimes).29 
5. Various aspects of the military burden, military expenditures per 
capita (MEP), and the share of defense expenditures in GNP 
(MEY) are assumed to be functions of• the revenue base (here • 
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depicted by the share of central government revenues in gross 
national product, (RTCRYB), and the share of defense in the 
government budget, GEDB. 
6. To close the model, public external debt PDB30 is assumed to be 
related to the overall level of economic activity (GNP), the value of 
imports (Tl), and the size of the armed forces (AF). Total imports 
were in tum assumed to be related to foreign exchange availability 
(proxied by the value of exports, TE), and the level of demand 
placed on imports by the military (depicted by total military 
expenditures, ME). Here it is assumed that in foreign exchange 
constrained countries where foreign exchange often tends to be 
rationed, the military would have first claim on the available foreign 
resources. 
7. Based on the previous section, 'threat' was proxied by the size of .. 
armed forces per capita in the previous year, AFP80. 
RESULTS 
The estimated equations31 show several distinct differences between 
civilian and military regimes: 
[two-stage least squares estimates - standardized regression coeffJ 
ARMS IMPORTS (Al) 
Military Regimes: 
(1) AI= 0.93 AI80 + 0.12 ME - 0.14 PDB80 + 0.14 GIRB80 
(30.27) (2.89) (-4.13) (3.68) 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.985; F = 298.38 
Civilian Regimes: 
(2) AI= 1.05 AI80 - 0.26 ME - 0.07 PDB80 + 0.10 GIRB80 
(2.71) (-0.52) (-0.07) (0.56) 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.735; F = 16.70 
ARMS IMPORTS- WITH THREAT 
Military Regimes: 
(1') AI= 0.98 AI80 + 0.15 ME - 0.15 PDB80 + 0.13 GIRB80 
(20.78) (3.35) (-4.45) (3.38) 
- 1.46 AFP80 
(-1.46) 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.98g; F = 256.52 • 
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Civilian Regimes: 
(2') AI= 0.81 AI80 - 0.20 ME+ 0.01PDB80+0.12 GIRB80 
(2.00) (-0.43) (0.06) (0.69) 
+ 0.27 AFP80 
(1.74) 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.775; F = 14.65 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME) 
Military Regimes: 
(3) ME = -0.09 GNP + 1.01 ME80 + 0.06 POP 
(-3.26) (44.008) (2.17) 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.995; F = 904.04 
Civilian Regimes: 
.. (4) ME = 0.08 GNP + 0.82 ME80 + 0.20 POP 
(2.28) (24.70) (5.12) 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.987; F = 438.49 
PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT (PDB) 
Military Regimes: 
(5) PDB = 0.68 GNP + 0.22 TI + 0.18 AF 
(7.91) (1.87) (2.08) 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.957; F = 104.49 
Civilian Regimes: 
(6) PDB = 1.07 GNP + 0.03 TI - 0.24 AF 
(9.90) (0.32) (-2.85) 
TOT AL IMPORTS (Tl) 
Military Regimes: 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.917; F = 66.23 
(7) TI = 0.11 TE +. 0.09 ME + 0.82 TISO 
(1.42) (2.10) (10.36) n,_;u.ii 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.987; F = 364.56 
Civilian Regimes: .l 
(8) TI = 0.01 TE - 0.07 ME + 1.03 TISO 
(0.13) (-3.05) (17.63) 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.995; F = 1101.47 
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ARMED FORCES (AF) 
Military Regimes: 
(9) AF = 0.24 POP + 0.01 GNP + 0.68 ME 
(1.19) (0.01) (3.84) 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.687; F = 10.22 
Civilian Regimes: 
(10) AF = 0.80 POP - 0.01 GNP + 0.25 ME 
(33.25) (-0.31) (11.06) 
ARMS CONTROL 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.996; F = 1366.38 
SHARE OF DEFENSE IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET (GEDB) 
Military Regimes: 
(11) GEDB = 0.43 CONFLICT - 0.56 GEHB 
(2.38) (-3.07) 
F = 17; r2 = 0.495; F = 7.32 
Civilian Regimes: 
(12) GEDB = 0.26 CONFLICT - 0.17 GEHB 
(1.20) (-0.76) 
F = 21; r2 = 0.084; F = 0.87 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA (MEP) 
Military Regimes: 
(13) MEP = 0.47 GEDB + 0.45 RTCRYB 
(2.56) (2.46) 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.508; F = 7.75 
Civilian Regimes: 
(14) MEP = 0.61 GEDB + 0.47 RTCRYB 
(5.26) (4.08) 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.765; F = 31.02 
MIUTARY BURDEN- SHARE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN GNP (MEY) 
Military Regimes: 
(15) MEY = 0.80 GEDB + 0.24 RTCRYB 
(6.22) (1.88) 
Df = 17; r2 = 0.763; F = 24.12 
--,·-::.F 
.. ·_.·,-
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Civilian Regimes: 
(16) MEY= 0.75 GEDB + 0.19 RTCRYB 
(5.56) (1.40) 
Df = 21; r2 = 0.682; F = 20.40 
IMPLICATIONS 
The results suggest a number of significant differences between civilian 
and military regimes with regard to the manner and environment in 
which budgetary priorities are established. In tum, these differences 
are manifested in the manner in which economic/threat factors 
influence the amount of resources devoted to defense. In particular: 
1. Military regimes appear to be relatively more committed to long-
run, sustained modernization of their armed forces. This is 
evidenced by much more continuity on a year-to-year basis in their 
importation of arms (the relatively high significance of the lagged 
arms import term - equation 1), and the statistical significance of the 
gross international reserve figures i.e. added reserves are system-
atically earmarked for weapons acquisition. For these countries, 
arms imports are also more closely linked to total military expendi-
tures. On the other hand there is evidence that by the early 1980s 
past borrowing for modernization was taking its toll in that external 
debt was placing some constraint on the ability of military regimes to 
import arms (the negative sign on the public external debt, 1980 -
equation 1). 
2. In contrast, civilian regimes appear to have a more erratic arms 
import pattern, suggesting that periodic modernizations and/or 
changing security conditions are relatively more important in affect-
ing these countries' importation of arms. As one might imagine, 
military regimes appear to have a commitment to sustained in-
creases in modernization of the military, and in this sense, may not 
have to vary arms imports significantly when external threats arise. 
Civilian regimes· may let their equipment deteriorate somewhat, 
forcing rapid increases in arms imports when threats arise. If this 
interpretation is correct, we should expect arms imports to civilian 
regimes to be much more responsive, relative to their military 
counterparts, to increased threats to security. 
3. If in fact third world countries respond to increased threats to 
security by initially increasing the number of men under arms, and if 
we proxy this effect by the number of armed forces per capita in the 
previous year (AFP80), and re-estimate· equations 1 and 2, our 
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hypothesis is borne out: arms imports to civilian regimes have a 
positive sign (equation 2'). This term is negative for the military 
regimes (equation l '). 
4. If military regimes do in fact place a higher priority, relative to their 
civilian counterparts, on defense on a year in year out basis, we 
would imagine their total military expenditures to be less influenced 
by economic constraints, i.e. everything else equal, countries 
usually devote a fairly constant share of their gross national product 
to the military. Military regimes usually cut social expenditures 
when increasing the share of resources allocated to defense. Since 
the ability of the military to reduce social expenditures will vary 
considerably from country to country, the final allocations to 
defense should be relatively less related to the economic base (gross 
national product) than in the case of civilian regimes. This pattern is 
borne out in terms of total military expenditures (equations 3 and 4) 
i.e., it appears that military regimes undertake defense allocations _ 
somewhat independently of the underlying economic/demographic -
base of their respective countries. In contrast to civilian regimes, 
these countries' gross national product and population play a rather 
insignificant role in setting bounds on total military expenditures. 
As with arms imports, military regimes exhibit relatively greater 
stability in military expenditures than is the case for their civilian 
counterparts (evidenced by the higher coefficient of lagged military 
expenditures, ME80). 
5. Military regimes appear to have borrowed externally32 to finance 
defense allocations (the positive sign on armed forces - AF, equa-
tion 5); whereas their civilian counterparts show no evidence of this 
pattern. 
6. Balance of payments difficulties, and external debt commitments, 
force many third world countries to ration foreign exchange to 
facilitate high priority imports. It follows that military regimes 
should exhibit a relatively more stable pattern between military 
expenditures and imports. This is borne out empirically: defense 
expenditures appear to have affected imports in the military 
regimes (equation 7), whereas civilian regimes actually show a 
negative relationship between defense allocations and imports 
(equation 8). 
7. As with military expenditures, one might expect the armed forces of 
civilian regimes to demonstrate a relatively more predictable 
relationship with the underlying demographic base. Again this 
pattern is borne out, with the armed forces of the civilian regimes 
(equation 10) bearing a close relationship to the underlying 
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demographic environment. Military regimes demonstrate no 
predictable pattern between population and the number of indi-
viduals in the armed forces (equation 9). 
8. The share of the budget allocations to defense in military regimes 
bears a fairly close relationship to the need of elites to resort to 
increased military power to retain power (CONFLICT, equation 
11), faced by the country. This pattern is not present in civilian 
regimes (equation 12). Military regimes apparently 'free up' 
resources for defense by reducing social (health) expenditures. 
Again civilian regimes do not have a predictable budgetary tradeoff 
pattern. 
9. As noted earlier, military and civilian regimes tend to have a 
number of superficial similarities with regard to defense allocation -
similar military burdens, armed forces per capita, and the share of 
the budget allocated to defense. These similarities extend to the 
determinants of military expenditures per capita and the military 
burden i.e. both regime types exhibit a fairly similar linkage 
between the share of the budget allocated to defense and the tax 
burden and these variables (equations 13, 14, 15, 16). 
In summary, while to some these results may appear self-evident, 
their empirical existence has not been previously identified. Military 
regimes appear committed to developing the size of the defense sector 
to levels not warranted by economic size per se. They have done this 
through extensive use of externally borrowed funds. They have utilized 
increases in foreign exchange earnings to expand defense allocations 
and appear much more prepared to deal with perceived threats than 
their civilian counterparts, i.e., they do not have to resort to stepped-up 
arms imports during periods of increased threat because presumably 
they have maintained a high degree of readiness. 
It is also interesting to note that well over 85 per cent of the 
fluctuations in both military expenditures and arms imports for military 
regimes can be accounted for by a limited number of economic vari-
ables. This fact holds irrespective of perceived threats, geographical 
location, or pressures from arms suppliers - factors often used to 
explain the level of military expenditures in the Third World. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The general sterotype of modern Third World military regimes is ultra-
conservativism combined with excessive military force to suppress 
popular opposition and external threats. Tqe empirical results pre-
sented here, while basically consistent with this image, still place Third 
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World military regimes in a somewhat different light compared with 
their civilian counterparts: 
1. Military regimes appear to be in somewhat better control of military 
expenditures than their civilian counterparts in the sense that 
defense allocations in these regimes are not as constrained by 
economic factors as in the case of their civilian counterparts. 
2. While still conjectural at this point, it appears that both military and 
civilian regimes allocate resources to defense largely on the basis of 
internal rather than external concerns. 
In this regard, Marek Thee33 has discussed the determinants of rapid 
military buildups in developing countries. He distinguishes between 
external factors, such as imperial rivalries and ideologicaVreligious 
conflict, and internal factors such as vested interests of the military, and 
the adoption of a national security doctrine or a strong military. He 
suggests that while globally (and this is particularly true for the super-
powers) internal factors are more important, armament in developing· 
countries 'tends to be animated by external factors'. 34 
The results obtained above tend to complement Thee 's approach in 
that the overwhelming importance of economic variables in explaining 
Third World military expenditures and their marked differences by 
regime type suggest that internal rather than external factors dominate 
in affecting differences between individual countries. 
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